



# **The Operational Environment and** **Multi-Domain Operations**

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# Developing the Army OE Narrative

① Starting with national policy & strategy, CONPLANS/OPLANS, DPS, 11 Army Missions...

② ...seen through the lens of threats...

Grounded in Intelligence...



③ ...continuously informed by...



Academia  
Industry



Policy Institutes

Foreign Partners/Perspectives

Military-Government



⑥ ...Creates the foundation for:

- Leader Development
- Training
- Doctrine & Concepts
- Capability Development

⑤ ...that are validated by...



Exercises  
Experimentation  
Simulations



④

...Creates Drivers...



# The Operational Environment to 2035



While we were engaged in the Middle East and South Asia, our adversaries were watching us and improving...

- Electronic Warfare
- Integrated Air Defenses
- Counter Space & PNT
- Cyber & Social Media
- Recon-Info-Strike Complexes
- Extensive use of UAVs
- Massed Artillery & Fires
- Protection
- Proxies
- Deception & Ambiguity
- CBRNE/WMD

## Potential for Overmatch



Electronic Warfare



Cyber & Space



Fighting Vehicles



Air Defense



MRLS & Rockets



Artillery

Different investment focus increased potential for overmatch

## Areas of Potential Competition and Conflict



## Pacing Threats

### Russia

- Capable nuclear near-peer adversary
- Seeks return to great power status
- Whole-of-Government approach to coercive competition
- Surpassed by China 2028-2035

### China

- Rapidly modernizing nuclear near-peer
- Global ambitions
- Increasing global economic competition and confidence
- Surpasses Russia by 2028-2035

### Ways of War are roughly similar

- Seek to prevail in competition phase
- Power across DIME-FL; focus on Information
- In conflict, contest all domains
- Nuclear deterrent

### Major Differences

- Geography
- Capacity
- Competence / Momentum

## Fundamental Changes



Laser Weapons



Synthetic Bio



RF Weapons




Internet of Things



Quantum



AI/Robotics



Energetics



Power



Hypersonics/Rail Guns

Future investment trajectories could lead to strategic surprise & no clear relative advantage

Future threat investment trajectories require we link "How We Fight" to "How We Will Fight" in Multi-Domain Operations



# *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*

**COMPETE**



**PENETRATE**



**DIS-INTEGRATE**



**EXPLOIT**



**RE-COMPETE**





# Multi-Domain Operations



The current strategic environment is typified by a state of **continuous competition** by Great Powers

– notably **China and Russia**

**Problem:** China and Russia pose three challenges:

- Challenge in all domains (*tactical*)
- Employ multiple layers of **Stand-off** (*operational*)
- Leverage competition space (*strategic*)  
to achieve operational and strategic objectives

**Solution:** The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept describes how the Army will reconcile these challenges:

- **compete** below threshold of armed conflict
- **penetrate** and **dis-integrate** enemy stand-off
- **exploit** the resultant freedom of maneuver
- **return to competition** on favorable terms

# Central Idea



***Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct Multi-Domain Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms.***

## Current Options

- ***Do nothing*** and concede competitor actions and readjust strategic objectives
- ***Win a protracted conflict*** by regaining the operational initiative and defeating enemy forces

## MDO Capable Force 2028/2035 Options

- ***Do nothing*** and concede competitor actions and readjust strategic objectives
- ***Expand the competitive space*** on favorable terms to deter enemy aggression (*preferred method*)
- ***Respond quickly*** to deny a *fait accompli* attack and achieve an operational position of advantage
- ***Win a protracted conflict*** by regaining the operational initiative and defeating enemy forces



# Threats Layer “Stand-off”




## Whole of Government

Diplomatic

Economic

Information




## National- & District-Level Forces

Ballistic Missiles & Cruise Missiles

Cyber & Information Warfare

Unconventional Warfare



## Conventional Forces

Long-Range Systems


Mid-Range Systems

Short-Range Systems



**Combined Arms Armies employ organic long-, mid-, and short-range systems to create operational and tactical stand-off that requires attacking functions rather than formations**

# Threats Create “Stand-off”



Threat seeks to separate friendly forces politically by fracturing alliances and partnerships through the integration of:

- Diplomatic and economic actions
- Unconventional warfare
- Information warfare
- Conventional forces

Threat creates stand-off by reducing speed of recognition, decision, and reaction

Threat seeks to separate friendly forces over time, space, and function through the integration of:

- Long-range fires
- Unconventional warfare
- Ground-based air defense systems
- Electronic warfare, space, and cyber

Threat creates stand-off by separating friendly forces over time, space, and function

Designed to capitalize on the predictability of the Joint Force, partners and allies



# The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operation

(How We Must Fight)




## Multi-Layered Stand-off

### Competition

- Create political separation
- Diplomatic means
  - Economic levers
  - Unconventional warfare
  - Information operations
  - Conventional forces

### Armed Conflict

- Separate the Joint Force in time, space and function
- Long-range fires
  - Unconventional warfare
  - Ground-based air defense systems
  - Electronic warfare, space, and cyber



Compete

Penetrate

Dis-Integrate

Exploit

Whole of Government

National- & District-Level Forces

Information Warfare,  
Unconventional Warfare  
IRBMs/SRBMs, Cruise Missiles,  
Cyber, Long-Range SAMs

Conventional Forces

SRBMs, Mid-Range SAMs, Long-Range  
Multiple Rocket Launchers

Multiple Rocket Launchers,  
Cannon Artillery

Maneuver, Short-Range Air  
Defense, Electronic Warfare,  
Counter-PNT, Cyber

Forward  
Presence  
Forces

Expeditionary  
Forces



# Tenets of Multi-Domain Operations



*Executing MDO requires changing how the Army: postures the force physically with increased authorities; organizes its formations; and employs its new capabilities and emerging technologies.*

## Calibrated Force Posture

## Multi-Domain Formations

## Convergence



**Forward Presence Forces**



**Conduct Independent Maneuver**




**Expeditionary Capacity**



**Employ Cross-Domain Fires**



**National-Level Capabilities**



**Maximize Human Potential**



**Authorities**



**Echelons Above Brigade Formations**

**The rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains through:**

- ♦ Cross-Domain Synergy
- ♦ Redundant Kill Chains
- ♦ Mission Command



# Questions?



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