


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Organizing for Information Warfare at the Geographic Combatant Commands

Lessons from the United States Central Command
Joint Effects Process



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About This Report

This report documents and evaluates a series of recent changes (2020–2023) to battle rhythm events and processes at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). These revised processes enable the consideration of the informational aspects of operations and support better integration of informational and physical effects across the spectrum of competition and conflict within the command. The report provides an evaluative framework useful for ensuring that future changes in battle rhythm events preserve the benefits gained to date and for guiding changes at other commands that want to gain similar benefits.

The research reported here was completed in August 2023 and underwent security review with the sponsor before public release.

RAND National Security Research Division

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